Rachelle Gabrang

 Rachelle Gabrang
Mentor: Dr. Marcus Kirk
Warrington College of Business
"As a second-year accounting major, I possess a passion for numbers and business. When I first learned of this high-level research program, I was enthusiastic about the opportunity to enrich my knowledge of accounting and elevate my analytic and communication skills. While currently working on the first portion of my working draft, I've already learned so much, and I'm certain this challenging experience will prove to be valuable later in my career. Furthermore, this program has been an excellent introduction to the world of scholarly research, which I aim to one day be a part of when I earn my PhD in accounting."




Information Systems and Operations Management

Research Interests

  • Auditing
  • Financial Reporting
  • Corporate Governance

Academic Awards

  • Fisher School of Accounting Dean's List
  • Jacksonville American Business Women's Association Scholarship
  • Florida Bright Futures


  • University of Florida Teaching Center
  • Fisher School of Accounting Council
  • Campus Kitchens Project


  • United Way Volunteer Income Tax Assistance
  • Relay for Life
  • Campus Kitchens Project

Hobbies and Interests

  • NBA
  • NHL
  • Guitar
  • Inline Skating

Research Description

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Earnings Quality
"Investments are a fundamental driver in today's economy. Corporations depend on the resources that investors supply, and investors earn something in return. To make the most informed investment decisions, one relies on the financial statements of businesses. But how confident can investors be in the validity of financial reports? In recent business scandals, millions of people have been betrayed by false statements, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars and the destruction of countless livelihoods. Thus, it is the critical role of auditors to certify that corporations have reported their statements in accordance to accounting standards and law. Too often, however, have auditors failed in their responsibility to remain independent in their engagements with clients. By colluding with corporate managers, auditors may overlook erroneous and fraudulent managerial accounting decisions. My research aims to find ways to elevate regulations that protect the independence of the auditor. One widely discussed possibility is mandatory audit firm rotation, which is essentially a limit on the tenure of audit firms with their clients. Proponents of mandating audit firm rotation believe that if auditors remain with a client for too long, their objectivity is compromised due to an economic interest in retaining a particularly prolific client. My research seeks to provide empirical evidence for or against mandatory audit firm rotation. By analyzing the relationship between audit firm tenure and the quality of earnings (a proxy for audit quality), I will determine if there is support for the notion that there is an increased likelihood of reduced audit quality as auditor tenure lengthens.